Category Archives: Trading

2012 Q2 Portfolio Review: +2.84% and +10.17%

My portfolio year-to-date returns as of the end of the second quarter are +2.84% for my individual account and +10.17% for my Roth IRA compared to +1.63% for the S&P 500.

I accidentally skipped doing this for the previous quarter and have been neglecting this blog in general for the past few months. At some point during the past few months, I decided to focus intensely on studying for Level 2 of the CFA exam which I wrote last weekend. Everything else, including this blog and managing my portfolio was secondary for quite some time. But now I can return to writing in my pathetic blog.

The orange line in the graph above represents my Roth IRA. The green line represents my individual account. Readers may not know that my individual account has essentially been passively managed for the entire existence of this pathetic blog and probably longer than that. In fact, I can’t remember the last time I made a trade in that account. The reason is that I still have a considerable amount of excess cash in my Roth IRA which I need to commit. Any trades (especially of a short-term nature) should first be made in my Roth IRA to take advantage of its tax benefits.

Overall, I’m still happy with my Roth IRA’s performance. I had a short position through TZA (a 3x levered short ETF that uses the Russell 2000 as its benchmark) for most of the year which I sold recently for a short profit. Unfortunately, I sold much too early, so I’ve been exposed to the recent market decline.

Given the passive nature of my individual account, I’m satisfied with its performance as well.

I normally don’t like talking about my positions publicly because I’m scared that announcing any positions will negatively affect my trading performance. So for now, I’ll only be able to discuss my trades retrospectively. Maybe I’ll change my stance on this position in the future. I’m willing to discuss my latest thoughts in private though.

Can Facebook Become The Biggest Company In The World?

I have never seen a sell-side analyst make a recommendation on a stock through a video like this. Is this the future of sell-side research? It feels a bit too polished for my tastes. I kept on waiting for some disclosure saying that they got paid to do this, but it never came.

That being said, I think the message is great. Neil Campling of Aviate Global LLP asks a simple question: Can Facebook become the biggest company in the world? It’s entirely possible that Facebook has crossed this critical threshold where the network effects within Facebook are so great that no other social networking site can flourish in the foreseeable future.

I mean, just take a look at Google+. One of the biggest and most successful internet companies has pretty blatantly been pushing its social network for almost a year now, and it still sucks. This is based on my non-scientific anecdotal interactions with Google+. Can anyone else do better?

Interested readers can also view a thirty minute presentation that Facebook has been showing at its roadshow presentations in preparation of its IPO here.

Panic Headline Investing

Whitney Tilson of T2 Partners talks about “panic headline investing”. He talks at length of two trades that have worked out great for him: BP and NFLX. He also says these kind of opportunities come around at least several times a month.

Diversification Is Broken

Two heat maps from a HSBC study on risk-on risk-off (“RORO”). The first heat map shows the correlation of several assets before the financial crisis. The second heat map shows the correlation of the same assets after the financial crisis.

Red indicates a correlation closer to 1.0 and blue indicates a correlation closer to -1.0. Pre-financial crisis, we see what we would expect in a normal functioning market: high levels of correlation among United States equity indices, high levels of correlation among European equity indices, and high levels of correlation among fixed income securities. And we see little correlation between these groups (like equities vs. commodities and equities vs. fixed income). Each asset class has a perfect correlation with itself which explains the diagnol line from the upper left to lower right.

After the financial crisis, we are seeing an explosion of correlation. It seems like everything is moving together. The exception is strong negative correlation among equities and fixed income due to the decline in interest rates.

All of this means that traditional measures of diversification are more difficult to achieve. I personally have played around with TZA, a 3x inverse ETF benchmarked to the Rusell 2000 to achieve some guaranteed level of downside protection. This has worked out well for me so far in reducing the volatility in my portfolio.

Some more discussion at FT Alphaville here.

Oaktree Capital’s Howard Marks: Reasons Why I Am Bullish On Equities

I previously wrote about Nassim Taleb’s position that investors should avoid exposure to the media. The reason is simple: journalists are primarily paid to get a readers attention while disseminating information is secondary. Taleb states, “The problem with information is not that it is diverting and generally useless, but that it is toxic.”

Oaktree Capital’s Howard Marks takes another view. Careful analysis of information presented by the media can be used to take the pulse of the market. Marks describes an article titled, “The Death of Equities” (written in 1979) which presents compelling arguments for why equities would continue to underperform going forward. However, the article actually marked the beginning of a 20-year bull cycle:

So the insightful, unemotional, contrarian investor will read an article like “The Death of Equities” and conclude that things are about as bad as they can get. And if things can’t get worse, they’ll probably get better eventually. it’s no more scientific than that. If in mid-1979 people though things could only get worse, there was no optimism to evaporate. That meant the litany of negatives actually foreshadowed something very different: The Rebirth of Equities. And that’s exactly what happened.

The S&P 500 gained 18.4% in 1979, the year “The Death of Equities” was written, and went on to average 18.9% a year for the next 20 years. There were only two down years during that span: a measly 4.9% in 1982 and 3.1% in 1990. This has to have been the best 21-year period in the modern era. Importantly, the stage had been set for this rise in 1979 by the accumulation and excessively pessimistic discounting of negatives.

Marks suggests that a similar situation may be occurring today. He suggests that sentiment is biased to the negative side at a time when stocks appear reasonably situated. The reasons include:

  • Stocks have returned almost nothing over the last twelve years.
  • For the first time, the 30-year return on stocks has been below the return on bonds.
  • The price of the S&P 500 index is still 8% below its 2000 high, while its companies’ earnings per share have nearly doubled over the intervening period.
  • Thus the P/E ratio on the S&P 500 is in the low double digits, a substantial discount from the post-World War II norm and down from the low 30s at the peak.
  • Just as in 1979, institutional investors have lost interest in equities and are looking increasingly to alternatives. The love affair with equities that ran from 1979 to 1999 seems to be over.
  • Allocations to equities have been cut substantially in favor of bonds and alternatives. For example, according to What I learned This Week of March 15, “The ICI reports that $408 billion was redeemed from U.S. equity mutual funds between 2007 and 2011 and $792 billion was invested in U.S. bond funds in the same period.”

Read the full memo here.

Seth Klarman on the Painful Decision to Hold Cash

Seth Klarman of Baupost Group writes in a 2004 year-end letter on the painful decision to hold cash. Although written over seven years ago, his advice is extremely relevant today. The overall market is up around 30 percent since the recent lows in October which can be disconcerting for investors who have not been fully invested.

Klarman touches upon a point that I have seen made by others — professional investment managers compete on relative performance rather than absolute performance. It’s okay to be down 20 percent if all your peers are down 20 percent, but it’s definitely not okay to be only up 10 percent if your peers are up 15 percent. Retail investors, on the other hand, aren’t faced with the constant pressure that comes with performance comparisons with some mandate or benchmark.

One interesting viewpoint that Klarman makes is that investors should view themselves as a business from a corporate finance point of view. Company management creates shareholder value by investing in projects with positive NPV. In other words, a projects internal rate of return should exceed the company’s cost of capital. Investors should view their investments in the same way:

Investors expect corporate managements to make carefully reasoned decisions, such as whether or not to commit their capital to build new factories, hire additional staff or acquire a competitor. A corporate management that invested capital at low expected returns just because they had the funds at their disposal and nothing immediately better to do would inevitably arouse investor ire. Why, then, should any investor (hedge fund, mutual fund or individual) always deploy 100% of their capital into marketable securities, applying none of the analytical rigor or intellectual honesty they would demand of the underlying corporate managements? As we said last year, why should the immediate opportunity set be the only one considered, when tomorrow’s may well be considerably more fertile than today’s.

Read the full excerpt from the letter here.

Oaktree Capital’s Howard Marks: The Relationship Between Sports and Investing

Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital Management is out with his latest memo. Readers unfamiliar with him may be surprised to know that Warren Buffet says, “When I see memos from Howard Marks in my mail, they’re the first thing I open and read.” He is regarded as one of the leading thinkers in the field of investment management.

In his latest memo, he draws upon a number of sports-related analogies from tennis, football, baseball, and soccer. His underlying message is that one should remain humble and strive for consistent returns rather than succumbing to the pressure of achieving extraordinary returns. In other words, the best investment managers do not “swing for the fences”:

“The key to investment success isn’t hitting home runs; it’s avoiding strikeouts and inning-ending double plays.” I say this over and over . . . and over . . . as you’ve no doubt experienced. But I truly believe it.

Investing is a testosterone-laden world where too many people think about how good they are and how much they’ll make if they swing for the fences and connect. Ask some I-know-school investors to tell you what makes them good, and you’ll hear a lot about home runs they’ve hit in the past and the home runs-in-the-making that reside in their current portfolio. How many talk about consistency, or he fact that their worst year wasn’t too bad?

One of the most striking things I’ve noted over the last 35 years is how brief most outstanding investment careers are. Not as short as the careers of professional athletes, but shorter than they should be in a physically non-destructive vocation. Where are the leading competitors from the days when I first managed high yield bonds 25 or 20 years ago? Almost none of them are around anymore. And astoundingly, not one of our prominent distressed debt competitors from the early days 15 or even 10 years ago remains a leader today.

Where’d they go? Many disappeared because organizational flaws rendered their game plans unsustainable. And the rest are gone because they swung for the fences but struck out instead.

That brings up something that I consider a great paradox: don’t think many investment managers’ careers end because they fail to hit home runs. Rather, they end up out of the game because they strike out too often – not because they don’t have enough winners, but because they have too many losers. And yet, lots of managers keep swinging for the fences.

Mathematically, this can be explained by realizing that an investor’s cumulative returns are a function of the investor’s geometric average returns and not simple average returns. An investor who achieves a return of -50 percent in the first year and +100 percent in the second year (thus breaking even) will have a geometric average of zero percent but a simple average of +25 percent.

Read the full memo, “What’s Your Game Plan”, here.

Nassim Taleb: Journalism May Be The Greatest Plague We Face Today

Nassim Taleb, in no uncertain words, shares his opinion on journalism in Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets:

Try the following experiment. Go to the airport and ask travelers en route to some remote destination how much they would pay for an insurance policy paying, say, a million tugrits (the currency of Mongolia) if they died during the trip (for any reason). Then ask another collection of travelers how much they would pay for insurance that pays the same in the event of death from a terrorist act (and only a terrorist act). Guess which one would command a higher price? Odds are that people would rather pay for the second policy (although the former includes death from terrorism). The psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky figured this out several decades ago. The irony is that one of the sampled populations did not include people on the street, but professional predictors attending some society of forecasters’ annual meeting. In a now famous experiment they found that the majority of people, whether predictors or nonpredictors, will judge a deadly flood (causing thousands of deaths) caused by a California earthquake to be more likely than fatal flood (causing thousands of deaths) occurring somewhere in North America (which happens to include California). As a derivatives trader I noticed that people do not like to insure against something abstract; the risk that merits their attention is always something vivid.

This brings us to a more dangerous dimension of journalism. We just saw how the scientifically hideous George Will and his colleagues can twist arguments to sound right without being right. But there is a more general impact by information providers in biasing the presentation of the world one gets from the delivered information. It is a fact that our brain tends to go for superficial clues when it comes to risk and probability, these include being largely determined by what emotions they elicit or the ease with which they come to mind. In addition to such problems with the perception of risk, it is also scientific fact, and a shocking one, that both risk detection and risk avoidance are not mediated in the “thinking” part of the brain but largely in the emotional one (the “risk as feelings” theory). The consequences are not trivial: It means that rational thinking has little, very little, to do with risk avoidance. Much of what rational thinking seems to do is rationalize one’s actions by fitting some logic to them.

In that sense the depiction coming from journalism is certainly not just an unrealistic representation of the world but rather the one that can fool you the most by grabbing your attention via your emotional apparatus – the cheapest to deliver sensation. Take the mad cow “threat” for example: Over a decade of hype, it only killed people (in the highest estimates) in the hundreds as compared to car accidents (several hundred thousands!) — except that the journalistic description of the latter would not be commercially fruitful. (Note that the risk of dying from food poisoning or in a car accident on the way to a restaurant is greater than dying from mad cow disease.) This sensationalism can divert empathy toward wrong causes: cancer and malnutrition being the ones that suffer the most from the lack of such attention. Malnutrition in Africa and Southeast Asia no longer causes the emotional impact — so it literally dropped out of the picture. In that sense the mental probabilistic map in one’s mind is so geared toward the sensational that one would realize informational gains by dispensing with the news. Another example concerns the volatility of markets. In people’s minds lower prices are far more “volatile” than sharply higher moves. In addition, volatility seems to be determined not by the actual moves but by the tone of the media. The market movements in the eighteen months after September 11, 2001, were far smaller than the ones that we faced in the eighteen months prior — but somehow in the mind of investors they were very volatile. The discussions in the media of the “terrorist threats” magnified the effect of these market moves in people’s heads. This is one of the may reasons that journalism may be the greatest plague we face today — as the world becomes more and more complicated and our minds are trained for more and more simplification.

All great investors consider themselves contrarian investors. Rather than avoiding journalism and the mainstream media (as Taleb recommends in a post I wrote earlier), I think profitable trading ideas can be sourced by systematically analyzing the news and measuring investor sentiment. When investors become too negative on a company, that often is a good entry point.

One thing I tend to look for is analyzing how a stock reacts to unambiguously good or bad news. Stocks should act as you expect — positive returns in response to positive news and negative returns in response to negative news. It’s when this relationship doesn’t hold that presents interesting opportunities. An anecdotal example: Several days ago, the latest industry reports stated that Research in Motion’s smartphone market share has declined again. Yet the stock price barely declined as a result. The interpretation is clear — this particular piece of bad news has already been priced into the stock. Buying at this entry point would have resulted in a quick 20 percent return.

Interested readers can buy Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets on Amazon.

2011 Portfolio Review: 23% and 27%

I finished this year near the highs of this year with a 23 percent return for my individual account and a 27 percent return for my Roth IRA versus zero percent for the S&P 500. In the third quarter of this year, I decided to change my focus from an absolute return perspective to maximizing my sharpe ratio (i.e. minimizing my volatility for a given level of return). I still have quite a large cash position which I am unwilling to commit due to the high volatility of my portfolio. In this case, I am willing to accept lower levels of return if my volatility is lowered. By focusing on minimizing my volatility, I may be comfortable in committing more capital in my trades. The overall effect of this would be to increase my absolute returns on a dollar basis even if my return on a percentage basis decreases.

My efforts to reduce my portfolio can be partially seen in my Roth IRA — the orange line in the chart located above. I initiated a small position in TZA, a 3x levered short ETF that tracks the Russell 2000, and increased my use of covered calls. I think I will continue to use this strategy to reduce my volatility going forward.

New positions initiated this quarter include a small position in Bank of America which I believe is at an attractive valuation now. I have also conducted research into Research in Motion and Netflix but have not yet initiated any positions.

I don’t anticipate 2012 to be a good year for me because many of my positions are reaching full valuation. My focus for the first half of next year will be to initiate various defensive option positions (ex: covered calls, vertical call spreads) since I don’t anticipate large gains in the short term.

For the next year, I hope to supplement my strategy of fundamental analysis with a more systematic and algorithmic approach to trading. Progress has been slow on this front, but I hope to show readers some preliminary models soon.

I thank the small collection of readers who frequent this pathetic blog, and I encourage readers to continue to comment on reach out to me through e-mail.

 

How Nassim Taleb Turned The Inevitability Of Disaster Into An Investment Strategy

Malcom Gladwell (author of Outliers, Blink, and The Tipping Point) on Nassim Taleb, Victor Niederhoffer, and George Soros (three great investors and thinkers):

“He didn’t talk much, so I observed him,” Taleb recalls. “I spent seven hours watching him trade. Everyone else in his office was in his twenties, and he was in his fifties, and he had the most energy of them all. Then, after the markets closed, he went out to hit a thousand backhands on the tennis court.” Taleb is Greek-Orthodox Lebanese and his first language was French, and in his pronunciation the name Niederhoffer comes out as the slightly more exotic Nieder hoffer. “Here was a guy living in a mansion with thousands of books, and that was my dream as a child,” Taleb went on. “He was part chevalier, part scholar. My respect for him was intense.” There was just one problem, however, and it is the key to understanding the strange path that Nassim Taleb has chosen, and the position he now holds as Wall Street’s principal dissident. Despite his envy and admiration, he did not want to be Victor Niederhoffer — not then, not now, and not even for a moment in between. For when he looked around him, at the books and the tennis court and the folk art on the walls — when he contemplated the countless millions that Niederhoffer had made over the years — he could not escape the thought that it might all have been the result of sheer, dumb luck.

Taleb knew how heretical that thought was. Wall Street was dedicated to the principle that when it came to playing the markets there was such a thing as expertise, that skill and insight mattered in investing just as skill and insight mattered in surgery and golf and flying fighter jets. Those who had the foresight to grasp the role that software would play in the modern world bought Microsoft in 1985, and made a fortune. Those who understood the psychology of investment bubbles sold their tech stocks at the end of 1999 and escaped the Nasdaq crash. Warren Buffett was known as the “sage of Omaha” because it seemed incontrovertible that if you started with nothing and ended up with billions then you had to be smarter than everyone else: Buffett was successful for a reason. Yet how could you know, Taleb wondered, whether that reason was responsible for someone’s success, or simply a rationalization invented after the fact? George Soros seemed to be successful for a reason, too. He used to say that he followed something called “the theory of reflexivity.” But then, later, Soros wrote that in most situations his theory “is so feeble that it can be safely ignored.” An old trading partner of Taleb’s, a man named Jean-Manuel Rozan, once spent an entire afternoon arguing about the stock market with Soros. Soros was vehemently bearish, and he had an elaborate theory to explain why, which turned out to be entirely wrong. The stock market boomed. Two years later, Rozan ran into Soros at a tennis tournament. “Do you remember our conversation?” Rozan asked. “I recall it very well,” Soros replied. “I changed my mind, and made an absolute fortune.” He changed his mind! The truest thing about Soros seemed to be what his son Robert had once said:

My father will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit. I mean, you know the reason he changes his position on the market or whatever is because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally goes into a spasm, and it’s this early warning sign.

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