Monthly Archives: December 2011

Financial Contagion

Andrew Leonard of Salon writes that the world is on the verge of a nervous breakdown:

It doesn’t seem healthy, but we’re going to have to get used to it. Volatility and vulnerability are built into the infrastructure of our modern world. The jury may still out on the chaos theory question of whether a single butterfly flapping its wings in Botswana can cause a typhoon in the Philippines, but we now know without a shadow of a doubt that the relative success or failure of a troubled European government’s attempt to raise cash can send instant shock waves across financial markets across the globe.

And we know, intimately, that it doesn’t take much to set off a cascade of trouble — after the great global crash of 2008, traders everywhere are in a state of permanent PTSD. Beyond the obvious surface connections between markets — that European recession slowing U.S. economic growth — there are abundant linkages beneath the scenes that are obscure and hard to unravel, interconnections woven by complex derivatives and hedging strategies and computer-driven high-speed trading algorithms that instantly translate woe in one market to panic in another.

The inescapable conclusion: Our modern high-tech markets, in which more money than ever before swirls around the globe in a blink of an eye, are better at transmitting panic and fear than anything heretofore created by humans. If civilization is supposed to imply progress, then something has gone very awry: In the second decade of the 21st century, our infrastructure is increasingly fragile, increasingly prone to disruption. The sword of Damocles hangs above everyone’s head, and the thread that keeps it from falling is fraying perilously thin.

Read the full article here. Read the New York Times article about traders in the U.S. waking up in the middle of the night to keep abreast of events in Europe here. Read the Wikipedia article on financial contagion here.

How I Conquered My Job

Interesting reflection from a former investment banking analyst. Draws heavily on what he has learned from his study of Hannibal:

I began to suspect that my success, and my entire existence, might be a joke. Officially, I was achieving things, relatively speaking. When the bank hired me, it flew me and the other London recruits to the headquarters in New York for our training program, and we were not allowed to travel on the same plane lest it crash and take all of us down at once. This suggested that we were important. Now, however, I was spending my days and my nights in the same cubicle under never-changing fluorescent light. Around me stretched an ocean of other cubicles, all of them filled with people like me. We had stiff necks and red eyes from staring at spreadsheets full of earnings ratios and other boring numbers day after day. We conversed in a strange language in which people were constantly “leveraging” something, usually “proactively.” Our business cards called us “analysts,” which meant that our job was to fiddle with these numbers until midnight or later every night. At that point a boss would call in from an expensive hotel room in some faraway time zone and tell us to fax documents to a client immediately. We faxed them. Then we waited in the cubicle for the fax confirmation, and kept waiting just in case the boss called again. Then we called a car service — the bank picked up the tab, because we were important — that took us home and the driver waited outside while we took a shower inside, so that we could take the same car back to the bank and start this process all over again.

This was my success. It was a success where booking a holiday was an act of masochism, because as soon as it was booked, I counted down to the moment — perhaps hours before departing for the airport — when a boss peered over my cubicle wall to announce that an “opportunity” had just presented itself for me to show my “commitment” to the “team” by canceling my holiday and staying in the cubicle to keep sending midnight faxes to executives in far-flung places. Then I got to tear up my plane tickets and settle back into my cubicle for more success.

I was alive — in a seething and angry way — to the irony of the situation, and so were a few of my friends at the bank. I took philosophical cigarette breaks with one of them, during which we walked along the Thames in front of the office. We were trying to figure out the personality types at the bank. Few of our colleagues appeared to see banking as a calling and nobody seemed to think that it was even remotely fun. So why were we all there? It must have been because we wanted to get somewhere else and saw the bank as a mountain range to cross. Perhaps we wanted training or experience of some sort for something bigger. But what? Neither my friend nor I wanted to be entrepreneurs or businessmen. We weren’t sure what we wanted. Once, when I was in the men’s room at work, an Italian colleague at the urinal next to me told me, sotto voce, that he couldn’t wait to get out of the bank so that he could go back to Italy to breed horses, but I had to promise not to tell anybody. Most of us, it seemed, were investment bankers because that’s what ambitious young people in the 1990s did, just as young aristocratic men in Hannibal’s time became warriors.

Read the full article here.

Is Modern Finance Getting More Complex?

People are getting smarter in what has been dubbed the Flynn Effect. FT Alphaville asks, why are we so good at creating complexity in finance?

We’ve become better at abstract thinking. We don’t have any trouble analysing a financial market that has no physical location, or considering credit exposures to sovereign nations through derivatives contracts. It’s just what we do.

Furthermore, as the ability to think abstractly correlates with intelligence, it becomes a self-reinforcing cycle where the people who are best at such reasoning stay longer in education, and get even better at abstract thinking, becoming even more intelligent… until one day, after many years of study, a good portion of them land in investment banks. So what do you think happens next? To what task is the abstract thinking capability employed?

Is it any wonder, then, that modern finance has become progressively more complex?  But at the same time, wouldn’t these exceptionally intelligent people be able to see the potential instability they are creating, and the increasingly large potential loss to society as a whole through bailouts, and the bypassing of the real economy?

Read the full article here. The Wikipedia links in the article are quite interesting as well.

James Altucher: Test, Test, Test

James Altucher on what he learned while trading for Victor Niederhoffer:

Test everything you can. If someone says to me, “There’s inflation coming so you better short stocks,” I know right away the person doesn’t test and will lose money. Data is available for almost anything you can imagine. (In my talks, I always discuss the “blizzard system” based on data of what the stock market does depending on how many inches of snow have fallen in Central Park that day). Victor and his crew would spend all day testing ideas: What historically happens to the market on a Fed day? What happens on options expiration day if the two prior days were negative? Do stocks that start with the letter “x” outperform? Nothing was beyond testing.

The First Day of the Month. It’s probably the most important trading day of the month, as inflows come in from 401(k) plans, 1RAs, etc. and mutual fund have to go out there and put this new money into stocks. Over the past 16 years, buying the close on SPY (the S&P 500 ETF) on the last day of the month and selling one day later would result in a successful trade 63% of the time with an average return of 0.37% (as opposed to 0.03% and a 50%-50% success rate if you buy any random day during this period). Various conditions take place that improve this result significantly. For instance, one time I was visiting Victor’s office on the first day of a month and one of his traders showed me a system and said, “If you show this to anyone we will have to kill you.” Basically, the system was: If the last half of the last day of the month was negative and the first half of the first day of the month was negative, buy at 11 a.m. and hold for the rest of the day. “This is an ATM machine” the trader told me. I leave it to the reader to test this system.

Read the full article here.

Have You Ever Tried To Sell A Diamond?

An excellent article from The Atlantic written in 1982:

De Beers proved to be the most successful cartel arrangement in the annals of modern commerce. While other commodities, such as gold, silver, copper, rubber, and grains, fluctuated wildly in response to economic conditions, diamonds have continued, with few exceptions, to advance upward in price every year since the Depression. Indeed, the cartel seemed so superbly in control of prices — and unassailable — that, in the late 1970s, even speculators began buying diamonds as a guard against the vagaries of inflation and recession.

The diamond invention is far more than a monopoly for fixing diamond prices; it is a mechanism for converting tiny crystals of carbon into universally recognized tokens of wealth, power, and romance. To achieve this goal, De Beers had to control demand as well as supply. Both women and men had to be made to perceive diamonds not as marketable precious stones but as an inseparable part of courtship and married life. To stabilize the market, De Beers had to endow these stones with a sentiment that would inhibit the public from ever reselling them. The illusion had to be created that diamonds were forever — “forever” in the sense that they should never be resold.

Read the full article here.

How Nassim Taleb Turned The Inevitability Of Disaster Into An Investment Strategy

Malcom Gladwell (author of Outliers, Blink, and The Tipping Point) on Nassim Taleb, Victor Niederhoffer, and George Soros (three great investors and thinkers):

“He didn’t talk much, so I observed him,” Taleb recalls. “I spent seven hours watching him trade. Everyone else in his office was in his twenties, and he was in his fifties, and he had the most energy of them all. Then, after the markets closed, he went out to hit a thousand backhands on the tennis court.” Taleb is Greek-Orthodox Lebanese and his first language was French, and in his pronunciation the name Niederhoffer comes out as the slightly more exotic Nieder hoffer. “Here was a guy living in a mansion with thousands of books, and that was my dream as a child,” Taleb went on. “He was part chevalier, part scholar. My respect for him was intense.” There was just one problem, however, and it is the key to understanding the strange path that Nassim Taleb has chosen, and the position he now holds as Wall Street’s principal dissident. Despite his envy and admiration, he did not want to be Victor Niederhoffer — not then, not now, and not even for a moment in between. For when he looked around him, at the books and the tennis court and the folk art on the walls — when he contemplated the countless millions that Niederhoffer had made over the years — he could not escape the thought that it might all have been the result of sheer, dumb luck.

Taleb knew how heretical that thought was. Wall Street was dedicated to the principle that when it came to playing the markets there was such a thing as expertise, that skill and insight mattered in investing just as skill and insight mattered in surgery and golf and flying fighter jets. Those who had the foresight to grasp the role that software would play in the modern world bought Microsoft in 1985, and made a fortune. Those who understood the psychology of investment bubbles sold their tech stocks at the end of 1999 and escaped the Nasdaq crash. Warren Buffett was known as the “sage of Omaha” because it seemed incontrovertible that if you started with nothing and ended up with billions then you had to be smarter than everyone else: Buffett was successful for a reason. Yet how could you know, Taleb wondered, whether that reason was responsible for someone’s success, or simply a rationalization invented after the fact? George Soros seemed to be successful for a reason, too. He used to say that he followed something called “the theory of reflexivity.” But then, later, Soros wrote that in most situations his theory “is so feeble that it can be safely ignored.” An old trading partner of Taleb’s, a man named Jean-Manuel Rozan, once spent an entire afternoon arguing about the stock market with Soros. Soros was vehemently bearish, and he had an elaborate theory to explain why, which turned out to be entirely wrong. The stock market boomed. Two years later, Rozan ran into Soros at a tennis tournament. “Do you remember our conversation?” Rozan asked. “I recall it very well,” Soros replied. “I changed my mind, and made an absolute fortune.” He changed his mind! The truest thing about Soros seemed to be what his son Robert had once said:

My father will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit. I mean, you know the reason he changes his position on the market or whatever is because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally goes into a spasm, and it’s this early warning sign.

Read the lengthy article here. Follow Curated Alpha via Email,RSS, or Twitter.

What I’m Reading

The harm of youth unemployment [Economist]

The 1 percent responds to attacks on income inequality [Bloomberg]

Leon Cooperman of Omega Advisors writes an open letter to President Obama [Omega Advisors]

The use of wiretaps in insider-trading cases [Bloomberg]

An inside look at David Einhorn’s big short [Reuters]

James Simons: Mathematics, Common Sense, and Good Luck: My Life and Careers

James Simons of Renaissance Technologies (one of the world’s most successful hedge funds) gives a lecture at MIT titled Mathematics, Common Sense, and Good Luck: My Life and Careers. While most of the talk is unrelated to financial markets, readers may be interested in what he has to say. His talk begins at approximately 10 minutes in, he begins talking about his career in investment management at around 28 minutes, and the Q&A section comprises the last 10 minutes.

The original video can be found here. Bloomberg has an excellent article detailing his life here.

The Financial Modeler’s Manifesto: MODELERS OF ALL MARKETS, UNITE!

Emanuel Derman and Paul Wilmott in response to the financial crisis felt compelled to write a short paper on The Financial Modeler’s Manifesto:

Physics, because of its astonishing success at predicting the future behavior of material objects from their present state, has inspired most financial modeling. Physicists study the world by repeating the same experiments over and over again to discover forces and their almost magical mathematical laws. Galileo dropped balls off the leaning tower, giant teams in Geneva collide protons on protons, over and over again. If a law is proposed and its predictions contradict experiments, it’s back to the drawing board. The method works. The laws of atomic physics are accurate to more than ten decimal places.

It’s a different story with finance and economics, which are concerned with the mental world of monetary value. Financial theory has tried hard to emulate the style and elegance of physics in order to discover its own laws. But markets are made of people, who are influenced by events, by their ephemeral feelings about events and by their expectations of other people’s feelings. The truth is that there are no fundamental laws in finance. And even if there were, there is no way to run repeatable experiments to verify them.

Like all physicians, Derman and Wilmott want all modelers to swear by The Modelers’ Hippocratic Oath:

MODELERS OF ALL MARKETS, UNITE! You have nothing to lose but your illusions.

  • ~ I will remember that I didn’t make the world, and it doesn’t satisfy my equations.
  • ~ Though I will use models boldly to estimate value, I will not be overly impressed by mathematics.
  • ~ I will never sacrifice reality for elegance without explaining why I have done so.
  • ~ Nor will I give the people who use my model false comfort about its accuracy. Instead, I will make explicit its assumptions and oversights.
  • ~ I understand that my work may have enormous effects on society and the economy, many of them beyond my comprehension.

Given Derman’s background as an academic it is not surprising that he advocates an indexing approach in his newest book Models Behaving Badly. The Wall Street Journal provides a short review:

The basic problem, according to Mr. Derman, is that “in physics you’re playing against God, and He doesn’t change His laws very often. In finance, you’re playing against God’s creatures.” And God’s creatures use “their ephemeral opinions” to value assets. Moreover, most financial models “fail to reflect the complex reality of the world around them.”

It is hard to argue with this basic thesis. Nevertheless, Mr. Derman is perhaps a bit too harsh when he describes EMM—the so-called Efficient Market Model. EMM does not, as he claims, imply that prices are always correct and that price always equals value. Prices are always wrong. What EMM says is that we can never be sure if prices are too high or too low.

The Efficient Market Model does not suggest that any particular model of valuation—such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model—fully accounts for risk and uncertainty or that we should rely on it to predict security returns. EMM does not, as Mr. Derman says, “stubbornly assume that all uncertainty about the future is quantifiable.”

The basic lesson of EMM is that it is very difficult—well nigh impossible—to beat the market consistently. This lesson, or “model,” behaves very well when investors follow it. It says that most investors would be better off simply buying a low-cost index fund that holds all the securities in the market rather than using either quantitative models or intuition in an attempt to beat the market. The idea that significant arbitrage opportunities are unlikely to exist (and certainly do not persist) is precisely the mechanism behind the Black-Scholes option-pricing model that Mr. Derman admires as a financial model behaving pretty well.

Read the full paper here. Read a review of Derman’s latest book Models Behaving Badly here. Buy the book off Amazon here.

Bruce Berkowitz’s Thesis on Bank Of America

Bruce Berkowitz of Fairholme Capital Management:

Audience Member 11: Thank you very much for your presentation. I’d like to change gears a little bit. You strike me as a graduate of a college of hard knocks and your love of the business comes through. Anything you want to share with us? What motivated you to get into this business?

Bruce Berkowitz: What motivated me? Money. I didn’t have any. I grew up in a lousy suburb of Boston. I wanted to have a better life than my parents, the great American dream. People do what they like so I started to like it. You can get good if you do something for 30 years, seven days a week for 24 hours a day. Unlike other activities such as professional sports, this is an activity that as long as everything’s good up top, you can do it for a long time, as long as you stay focused.

The question to ask yourself is why did some very smart people in this area get fooled by Bernie Madoff. I can understand the average person, but highly intelligent, professional people in the investing world got taken in. How did that happen? That’s the question you have to answer and make sure you don’t do that.

Read the rest of the transcript here which includes discussion on Berkowitz’s thesis on Bank of America and general investing methodology.